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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
 This interlocutory appeal requires interpretation of a 
title insurance policy that contains a widely-used endorsement 
known as the American Land Title Association 9 
Endorsement (“the ALTA 9 Endorsement”).  Specifically, 
this court must decide whether the scope of coverage under  
¶ 1(b)(2) of the ALTA 9 Endorsement encompasses losses 
resulting from entire instruments, or whether the coverage is 
limited to losses caused by the particular types of 






Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Co. 
(“Commonwealth”) issued the title insurance policy at issue 
in this case to Nationwide Life Insurance Co. (“Nationwide”) 
in connection with real property in the Franklin Mills Mall in 
Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania (“the Property”).  The 
Franklin Mills Mall is a large shopping center specializing in 
retail stores.  The Property was owned by Liberty Mills 
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Limited Partnership (“Liberty Mills”) when Liberty Mills 
entered into a Master Declaration and Agreement of 
Easements, Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions (the 
“Master Declaration”) with Liberty Mills Residual Limited 
Partnership in 1988, which governs all stores in the Mall.  
Later that year, PMI Associates (“PMI”) purchased the 
Property from Liberty Mills, at which time PMI and Liberty 
Mills also entered into a Declaration of Restrictions.  The 
Declaration of Restrictions vested Liberty Mills with, inter 
alia, the right to prior approval of future purchasers of the 
Property and an express option to purchase.  
 
 PMI borrowed $3.5 million from Nationwide in 2001, 
using the Property as collateral.  Nationwide purchased a title 
insurance policy (“the Policy”) from Commonwealth to 
insure its lender‟s interest in the Property.  The Policy 
contains a specific endorsement that is known as the ALTA 9 
Endorsement, which states (in relevant part): 
 
The Company [Commonwealth] insures the 
owner of the indebtedness secured by the insured 
mortgage [Nationwide] against loss or damage 
sustained by reason of: 
 
1.  The existence at Date of Policy of any of 
the following: 
… 
       (b) Unless expressly excepted in Schedule B 
    … 
(2) Any instrument referred to in 
Schedule B as containing covenants, 
conditions or restrictions on the land 
which, in addition, (i) establishes an 
easement on the land; (ii) provides a lien 
for liquidated damages; (iii) provides for 
a private charge or assessment; 
(iv) provides for an option to purchase, a 
right of first refusal or the prior approval 







  Among the documents listed in Schedule B Part 
I were the Declaration of Restrictions and the Master 
Declaration, but no specific restriction found within those 
documents was explicitly listed.   
 
 PMI defaulted on its loan from Nationwide in 2003 
and conveyed the Property to Nationwide by fee simple deed 
in lieu of foreclosure.  Nationwide attempted to sell the 
Property to Ironwood Real Estate, LLC (“Ironwood”), but 
Liberty Mills‟ successor in interest—Franklin Mills Limited 
Partnership (“Franklin Mills”)—refused to approve Ironwood 
as a buyer in accordance with the rights conferred by the 
Declaration of Restrictions.
2
  Ironwood‟s offer to purchase 
the Property was contingent upon Franklin Mills‟ approval of 
the anticipated use by Ironwood of the Property as a technical 
school.  Franklin Mills rejected this proposed use, perhaps as 
being inconsistent with the use restrictions found within the 
Declaration of Restrictions, which required the Property to be 
used “only for the purposes of a variety or general 
merchandise store” absent prior consent from Franklin Mills.  
J.A. at 329.  These use restrictions were left in force under a 
settlement agreement reached in another case, in which 
Nationwide had sued Franklin Mills in an attempt to 
invalidate the encumbrances on title that prevented this sale.  
See Nationwide Life Ins. Co. v. Franklin Mills Assocs. Ltd. 
P’ship, No. 04-5049 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 28, 2008), ECF No. 30.   
 
                                              
1
 The restrictions listed in (i)-(iv) will hereinafter be 
referred to as “the ¶ 1(b)(2) restrictions.”   
 
2
 The parties dispute whether this refusal was based on 
one of the ¶ 1(b)(2) restrictions or, instead, the use 
restrictions.  The parties agree, however, that whatever 
restrictions formed the basis for the refusal were found within 
the Declaration of Restrictions.  See Appellee‟s Br. at 6; 
Reply Br. at 2 n.1 (“There is no dispute that the use 
restrictions contained within the Declaration of Restrictions 
were largely (if not solely) to blame for the fall through of 
this particular sale.”). 
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Nationwide submitted a claim for coverage to 
Commonwealth, asserting that the restrictions relied upon by 
Franklin Mills to justify its refusal of Ironwood as a purchaser 
rendered the Property unusable and unsalable.  
Commonwealth denied Nationwide‟s claim.   
 
 Nationwide filed a complaint in the District Court, and 
Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that 
Nationwide was seeking coverage for harm alleged to arise 
from the Declaration of Restrictions, which was listed in 
Schedule B and was thus expressly excepted from coverage 
under the Policy.  The District Court granted 
Commonwealth‟s motion, and Nationwide appealed. 
 
After oral argument, this court reversed and remanded, 
holding that “Commonwealth bore the burden of detecting the 
restrictions stated in the Declaration, and had to list those 
restrictions explicitly [and not just the Declaration itself] as 
exceptions to avoid covering loss from them.”  Nationwide 
Life Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 579 F.3d 
304, 319 (3d Cir. 2009) (“Nationwide I”).3  
                                              
3
 Nationwide argues that Commonwealth‟s current 
position is barred by the law of the case doctrine.  To the 
extent that the language in this court‟s prior opinion appears 
to suggest that Commonwealth is obligated to cover 
Nationwide‟s claim, the procedural posture of the last appeal 
restricts the impact of this language:  this court held only that 
Commonwealth is obligated to cover Nationwide‟s claim if 
the facts as alleged in Nationwide‟s complaint are true.  In 
other words, this court only held that Commonwealth must 
cover Nationwide‟s claim if the restriction causing 
Nationwide‟s harm was covered by the ALTA 9 Endorsement 
and not expressly excepted from coverage on Schedule B.  
Because Nationwide asserted its harm was caused by a ¶ 
1(b)(2) restriction, this court had no reason to determine 
whether the failure to list a ¶ 1(b)(2) restriction on Schedule B 
meant the entire instrument containing that restriction was 
covered by the ALTA 9 Endorsement.  Thus, the question 
certified for this interlocutory appeal has not yet been 
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On remand, Nationwide filed an amended complaint, 
and Commonwealth and Nationwide filed cross-motions for 
summary judgment.  The District Court denied 
Commonwealth‟s motion in its entirety and granted 
Nationwide‟s motion in part, holding, inter alia, that the 
Policy with the ALTA 9 Endorsement affords insurance 
coverage for losses and damages incurred by Nationwide as a 
result of the Declaration of Restrictions.  See Nationwide Life 
Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., No.  
05-281, 2011 WL 611802 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 17, 2011).
4
       
 
 Commonwealth filed a motion for reconsideration or, 
alternatively, for interlocutory appeal, and Nationwide filed a 
response in opposition.  The District Court denied the motion 
for reconsideration but granted a certificate of appealability.  
The question certified by the District Court is:  
 
Whether the American Land Title 
Association 9 Endorsement provides 
title insurance coverage for whole 
instruments listed in Schedule B or 
whether the scope of coverage is limited 
to particular types of encumbrances. 
 
Nationwide Life Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. 
Co., Order at 1, No. 05-281 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 23, 2011), ECF 
No. 67. 
   
II.  
 
Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
                                                                                                     




 The District Court also held that Nationwide is entitled 
to appropriate prejudgment interest but that issues of material 
fact preclude summary judgment as to the questions of 
Commonwealth‟s alleged bad faith and the precise 
determination of damages.  See id. at *32. 
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The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1332.  This court has jurisdiction over this 
interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). 
   
When this case was previously before us, we noted 
that “[i]nterpretation of an insurance policy is a question of 
law over which we exercise plenary review.”  Nationwide I, 
579 F.3d at 307.  We stated, “[u]nder Pennsylvania law, 
which applies to this action, we ascertain the intent of the 
parties by reading the policy as a whole, and we give 
unambiguous terms their plain meaning.  We also consider 
evidence of industry custom and practice.  We construe 
ambiguous terms strictly against the insurer, but avoid 
reading the policy to create ambiguities where none exist.”  
Id. at 307-08 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); 
see also Sunbeam Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 781 A.2d 
1189, 1193 (Pa. 2001) (“If words have a special meaning or 
usage in a particular industry, then members of that industry 
are presumed to use the words in that special way, whatever 
the words mean in common usage and regardless of whether 






Commonwealth does not dispute that Nationwide‟s 
harm was caused by provisions within the Declaration of 
Restrictions.  Commonwealth also does not dispute that ¶ 
1(b)(2) of the ALTA 9 Endorsement applies to the 
Declaration of Restrictions.
5
  Commonwealth argues only that 
                                              
5
 See also Nationwide I, 579 F.3d at 309-10 (“[B]ecause 
the Declaration is an „instrument referred to in Schedule B as 
containing . . . restrictions on the land which . . . provides for 
an option to purchase, a right of first refusal or the prior 
approval of a future purchaser or occupant,‟ loss arising from 
it is covered under paragraph 1(b)(2) of the ALTA 9 
Endorsement „[u]nless expressly excepted in Schedule B.‟” 
(alterations in original) (quoting the Policy)).  Specifically, 
Commonwealth agrees that the Declaration of Restrictions 
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its listing the Declaration of Restrictions on Schedule B 
excluded losses arising from that instrument from coverage 
except as to the ¶ 1(b)(2) restrictions found therein, which 
(under this court‟s prior decision) must be expressly listed in 
Schedule B to be excluded from coverage.  Therefore, the 
remaining question is whether the failure to expressly except 
a ¶ 1(b)(2) restriction in Schedule B places only losses arising 
from that specific restriction back into coverage, or whether 
losses sustained by reason of any provision in the entire 
instrument in which the ¶ 1(b)(2) restriction is found are 
placed back into coverage.   
 
The District Court held that “[a]ny loss arising as a 
result of any portion of that instrument—and not from any 
particular provision contained therein—falls within the scope 
of the ALTA 9 Endorsement coverage.”  Nationwide, 2011 
WL 611802, at *14 (footnote omitted).  The District Court 
reasoned that “[b]y its plain language, . . . the Endorsement 
only defines what types of instruments are covered and then 
clearly insures against any loss sustained from the instrument 
itself.”  Id.  The District Court noted that “[h]ad the 
Endorsement meant otherwise, it would have eliminated the 
language „any instrument‟. . . .”  Id. 
 
We agree, and thus hold that the ALTA 9 Endorsement 
provides coverage to losses arising from entire instruments 
that fit within its plain language, not just the ¶ 1(b)(2) 
restrictions within those instruments that have not been 
expressly excepted.  If ¶ 1(b)(2) was not intended to cover 
losses arising due to entire instruments, then the phrase “any 
instrument” would have been omitted, as it was in ¶ 1(b)(1), 
(3), (4), and (5) of the same ALTA 9 Endorsement.  
 
Commonwealth and the Amici argue that this plain 
language interpretation of the ALTA 9 Endorsement provides 
far more coverage to the insured than the interpretation that is 
accepted by the vast majority of the title insurance industry.  
Commonwealth argues that “evidence of the ALTA 9 
                                                                                                     
contains at least an option to purchase and a prior approval of 
a future purchaser provision.  See Reply Br. at 6.   
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endorsement‟s customary usage within the title insurance 
industry makes clear that ALTA 9 is intended to provide 
additional coverage only for harm arising from a very specific 
category of extraordinary encumbrances that would affect the 
validity, priority, or enforceability of the insured mortgage—
i.e., the ALTA 9 [¶] 1(b)(2) encumbrances.”  Appellant‟s Br. 
at 24.  Indeed, it may be that the title insurance industry has 
been using the ALTA 9 Endorsement with the understanding 
that it only provides coverage for loss resulting from the 
¶ 1(b)(2) restrictions.
6
  Nevertheless, caselaw requires us to 
follow the plain language of the ALTA 9 Endorsement rather 
than deferring to industry custom and usage that does not give 
the phrase “any instrument” special meaning, but instead 
simply ignores that language.  J.C. Penney Life Ins. Co. v. 
Pilosi, 393 F.3d 356, 363 (3d Cir. 2004) (Under Pennsylvania 
law, “[w]here . . . the language of an insurance contract is 
clear and unambiguous, a court is required to enforce that 
language.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); 
Sunbeam, 781 A.2d at 1193 (allowing evidence of the 
“special meaning” of words within an industry); see also 
Meyer v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc., 648 F.3d 154, 167 (3d Cir. 
2011) (“[U]nder Pennsylvania law, in close cases, a court 
should resolve the meaning of insurance policy provisions in 
favor of coverage for the insured.” (citing Motley v. State 






 We will affirm the District Court‟s holding that the 
ALTA 9 Endorsement insures against any loss sustained from 
                                              
6
 Both parties address recent proposed amendments to the 
ALTA 9 Endorsement, which will ensure that the effect of 
this court‟s decision will be limited to title insurance policies 
that were issued with the older version of the ALTA 9 
Endorsement.  Because the amendments show only that the 
ALTA 9 Endorsement was changed to reflect a recent 
relevant court opinion, the significance of the changes can 
only be determined through speculation.  
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an instrument that is covered by the plain language of 
¶ 1(b)(2).  This case will return to the District Court for the 
determination of damages owed to Nationwide. 
 
 
 
 
